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LOOKING BACK ON
PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY
Chris Whitman*
Scholarship that tells us what is really at stake in the lives of people
affected makes the law honest and responsive. Whether or not it di-
rectly shapes doctrine, this type of scholarship can capture imagination
and influence judgment. The Michigan Law Review has published
some of the best of this work: Yale Kamisar's articles on coerced con-
fessions,' Terry Sandalow's essay on affirmative action,2 Joe Sax and
Phillip Hiestand's description of the emotional impact of living in a
slum,3 Martha Chamallas and Linda Kerber's demonstration of how
injuries that uniquely befall women have been dismissed as merely
emotional wrongs,4 and, most relevant to my project, Don Regan's ar-
ticle on abortion' and Martha Mahoney's on separation assault.'
Civil rights doctrine is thin and vulnerable when it develops with-
out any genuine effort to understand and articulate the significance of
the right claimed to the protected class. The Supreme Court's abortion
law is an important example of this phenomenon. A woman's right to
choose to have an abortion free from state coercion was defined, de-
veloped, and constricted without any sustained effort on the part of
the Court to articulate why such a right actually is important to
women. The right has survived almost three decades but is now barely
alive, apparently settled into a minimal existence, protected only
against the most overwhelming of state incursions.
In this Essay, I explore the implications of this failure. Part I dis-
cusses the compromise reached by the Supreme Court a decade ago in
* Francis A. Allen Collegiate Professor of Law and Professor of Women's Studies, Uni-
versity of Michigan. B.A. 1968, M.A. 1970, J.D. 1974, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
"New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966);
Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled
Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929 (1995).
2. Terrance Sandalow, Identity and Equality: Minority Preferences Reconsidered, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1874 (1999).
3. Joseph L. Sax & Phillip Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869
(1967).
4. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
5. Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979).
6. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Sepa-
ration, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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its last major abortion case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey.7 Part II ar-
gues that the undue burden test adopted in Casey protects women
only against total prohibitions on their right to choose to have a safe
abortion. Like traditional rules regarding rape, it requires women to
resist to the utmost in order to preserve their liberty. Less serious bur-
dens are classified as mere inconveniences. Part III points to two fine
articles published in the Michigan Law Review as examples of scholar-
ship informed by attention to women's lives that should have ex-
panded the Court's perspective. Part IV contends that the choice to
have an abortion is, for some women, both an unavoidable and an
ethical decision. It argues that more attention to what abortion means
to women ought to lead all the Justices to see the question as a true
moral conflict, rather than a choice between morality on one side and
convenience or amorality on the other.
I. THE CASEY COMPROMISE
Overall, the Court's record in understanding and articulating the
perspective of women has been mixed. It has been quick to perceive
how traditional stereotypes can harm untraditional women, as when it
saw that Virginia's all-woman alternative to its state-run military insti-
tute for men would be inadequate for a woman seeking "adversative"
training,' or when it found sex discrimination in the negative evalua-
tions of a female candidate for partnership at Price Waterhouse.9 But
when it comes to protecting women in more traditional roles relating
to sex and motherhood, the Court has been astonishingly obtuse. It
failed to see gender discrimination in practices that burden preg-
nancy,10 and accepted the gender norm of male promiscuity as a justi-
fication for upholding citizenship regulations that distinguish between
children born overseas to alien men and American women and those
born overseas to alien women and American men.11
Abortion may be uniquely difficult because it implicates both
sexuality and the meaning of motherhood. The Court came the closest
to articulating why abortion rights are important to many women as
part of its constitutional analysis in Casey. Casey involved a challenge
to a Pennsylvania statute that imposed a variety of constraints on
women who seek abortions, and on the doctors and clinics that pro-
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
9. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 409 U.S. 228 (1989).
10. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (interpreting Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act; overturned by Congress in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k)); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
11. Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
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vide them. Immediate reaction to the opinion varied dramatically.
Most moderate observers of the Court were surprised, and many were
pleased, by the Court's careful reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade, for the
Court had seemed poised to reverse that decision. Those who had
hoped for a reversal of Roe were dismayed, but so were abortion-
rights advocates, many of whom regarded the opinion as a disaster.
The opinion seemed to be written by several different authors who re-
fused to listen to each other. It reaffirmed Roe in language sensitive to
Roe's importance to women generally and, simultaneously, limited
constitutional protections severely, with an almost callous disregard
for the women most in need of protection.
Since Casey, the Court has not returned to the broad question of
whether the right to seek an abortion exists. Its subsequent abortion
cases, Mazurek v. Armstrong"2 and Stenberg v. Carhart,"3 were treated
as applications of Casey to new questions. In Mazurek, the Court, by a
vote of six to three, held that laws specifically designed to discourage
abortions would be constitutional, so long as they had little actual ef-
fect. In Stenberg, the Court, bitterly divided, struck down a state law
that prohibited "partial-birth" abortions even when the mother's life
or health was at risk.
Neither majority opinion questioned Casey's formulation of the
constitutional test. Casey appears to have defined a consensus that has
reduced the pressure on the Court to reassess basic principles and that
has endured for almost a decade. It is not unfair to see Casey as a vin-
dication of the right articulated in Roe after two decades of political
and academic challenge. The political challenge accomplished a great
deal in limiting the breadth of the right to choose abortion, but it was
not as successful as its organizers had hoped. When Casey was de-
cided, the Court, for the first time, had a clear majority of Justices who
had either written an opinion challenging Roe or had been appointed
by a President committed to reversing the decision. Just three years
earlier, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,4 there appeared to
be four votes for abandoning any serious review of state restrictions
on abortion, and many Court-watchers were confident that one of the
newly appointed Justices - either Souter or Thomas - would pro-
vide a fifth vote for reversal.
The fifth vote never materialized. Justice Souter joined Justice
O'Connor, who had been considered a possible vote against Roe, and
Justice Kennedy, who had been part of the hostile four in Webster.
Together they wrote an opinion describing itself as affirming "the es-
12. 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
13. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
14. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
1982 [Vol. 100:1980
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sential holding of Roe."15 Justices Stevens and Blackmun were willing
to go further in striking down the Pennsylvania restrictions under at-
tack in Casey. They joined the others to form a five-Justice majority
for its result. The other four Justices would have upheld the
Pennsylvania statute in its entirety. Thus, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy
and Souter formed the decisive bloc of the Court.
Those who had been dreading the reversal of Roe were exhilarated
by the tone of the majority opinion. The Court reaffirmed Roe in
ringing language rarely heard from the late twentieth-century
Supreme Court. The opinion begins: "Liberty finds no refuge in a ju-
risprudence of doubt"'6 and ends with a reference to "the freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the promise of lib-
erty."' 7 It includes an extended, careful, and even deeply-felt discus-
sion of the Court's obligation to adhere to precedent. Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter - all three appointed by Republican
presidents who were looking for jurists who would be skeptical of the
sort of judicial activism exemplified by Roe - appear, ironically, to
have found in Casey an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment
to the stability of law by reaffirming Roe.
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Casey is rare, even
unique, among the Court's abortion cases in that it contains more than
a cursory discussion of what reproductive rights have meant for
women, of what might be risked if these rights are not retained. Roe
itself famously cast the right to choose an abortion as a medical deci-
sion, in which the woman's interests are subordinate to her doctor's
professional commitment to provide appropriate care. In elucidating
the "right of privacy" in Roe, Justice Blackmun did briefly describe
the harms that might befall a woman deprived of choice. This descrip-
tion had little effect, however, perhaps because it seemed tentative,
even cold. The woman, like Blackmun's language, is largely passive."
And in the end, the woman disappears completely as Justice
15. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
16. Id. at 844.
17. Id. at 901.
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Blackmun writes:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice
altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early preg-
nancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis-
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health
may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional dif-
ficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors
the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
June 20021 1983
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Blackmun's argument dissolves all concern for women into medical
matters to be decided by a physician.19
The majority opinion in Casey, too, spends only a few sentences
describing the effect of restrictions on women who seek abortions.
Nevertheless, in these few sentences the focus shifts from medical pri-
vacy to individual liberty. Professional medical decisionmaking has
disappeared. Instead, the Court powerfully captures the despair at
being turned to another's purposes that is at the core of this debate for
many women:
[T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human
condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full
term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she
must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human
race been endured by woman [sic] with a pride that ennobles her in the
eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be
grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too
intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own
vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the
course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual impera-
tives and her place in society.
20
The majority Justices' sensitivity to what Roe has meant for the
ability of women to live according to their own goals and values comes
up again in their discussion of the precedential effect of Roe, where
they describe the critical role that decision played over the prior two
decades in advancing the equal participation of women in the "eco-
nomic and social life of the Nation."21 Because of Roe, women had, for
the first time, been able to make life plans with some confidence that
their dreams would not be derailed by an unexpected pregnancy.22 Fi-
nally, in the Court's discussion of the spousal notification provision,
19. See id. at 165-66 (vindicating "the right of the physician to administer medical treat-
ment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests
provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision
in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it
must rest with the physician").
20. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
21. Id. at 856.
22. See id. The Court noted:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in soci-
ety, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail. The
ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives. The Constitution serves human
values, and, while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the
certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living around
that case be dismissed.
1984 [Vol. 100:1980
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the one aspect of the Pennsylvania law that was found to be unconsti-
tutional, the Justices acknowledged the pervasiveness of domestic
violence and the actual constraint it can impose on individual
women. 3 Pennsylvania's requirement that a woman seeking an abor-
tion certify that her husband has been informed, they said, would pre-
vent "the significant number of women who fear for their safety and
the safety of their children.., from procuring an abortion as surely as
if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortions in all cases. '24 Although
the plurality did not draw the connection explicitly, it appeared to ap-
preciate the feminist insight that a safe home environment is critically
important to women's equality in public life.
II. THE "ESSENTIAL HOLDING" OF ROE
The majority opinion in Casey revealed a sensitivity to the impact
of legal rights on the actual lives of people that had been largely miss-
ing from majority opinions of the time.25 But, despite all this, Casey
can also be viewed as a significant betrayal of the hopes raised by Roe.
The plurality Justices - O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter - actually
make only the most grudging acknowledgment of the right to choose
to have an abortion, perhaps because the Court came so late to the
appreciation of Roe's significance for women's lives, or perhaps be-
cause that appreciation has never been integrated into a developed
body of constitutional doctrine. The relative silence of the Court over
the decade since Casey confirms what many feared at the time: the
stirring paragraphs of Casey did not promise a new attention to the
situation of women, but marked the outer boundaries of a compromise
that will protect women only from the most overwhelming and total
coercion.
23. Id. at 897. The Court noted that:
For the great many women who are victims of abuse inflicted by their husbands, or whose
children are the victims of such abuse, a spousal notice requirement enables the husband to
wield an effective veto over his wife's decision. Whether the prospect of notification itself
deters such women from seeking abortions, or whether the husband, through physical force
or psychological pressure or economic coercion, prevents his wife from obtaining an abor-
tion until it is too late, the notice requirement will often be tantamount to the veto found un-
constitutional in [Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.] Danforth [428 U.S. 52 (1976)]. The
women most affected by this law - those who most reasonably fear the consequences of no-
tifying their husbands that they are pregnant - are in the gravest danger.
Id. The opinion relied heavily on the District Court's findings of fact. Id. at 888-91.
24. Id. at 894.
25. Another exception was Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), decided the week be-
fore Casey, which held school prayer in public schools to be unconstitutional. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens as well as
Justices O'Connor and Souter, spent some time considering "the position of the students,
both those who desired the prayer and she who did not," id. at 590, before concluding that
the pressure to conform, both from the state and from peers in the state-created context, was
real enough to infringe upon First Amendment rights. Id. at 593.
1985June 20021
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Only Justices Blackmun and Stevens, who wrote separately in
Casey, adhered to the more searching review of abortion regulation
that had been used as recently as the mid-1980s when Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Powell were still on the Court.26 The Casey plural-
ity opinion did not reaffirm Roe; it only reaffirmed "the central hold-
ing of Roe." 7 It rejected Roe's trimester framework, which prohibited
all state regulation of abortion (other than the requirement that abor-
tions be performed by physicians) in the first trimester of pregnancy.
Instead, while continuing to treat viability of the fetus as the boundary
beyond which a woman no longer possesses the "right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy,"28 the plurality held that states may regulate
abortion procedures from the moment of conception in order to vindi-
cate the states' "profound interest in potential life."'2 9
The Court also said that states could constitutionally regulate in
ways that clearly express hostility to the choice to have an abortion or
in ways that impose increased costs upon and barriers to abortion, so
long as the constraints adopted do not place an "undue burden" upon
a woman who wants to exercise her right.3" An "undue burden" is one
that "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."31
The significance of Casey, then, turns on what is meant by "a sub-
stantial obstacle." With this standard in mind, the language quoted
above - that a spousal notification requirement would prevent a
"significant number of women.., from procuring an abortion as
surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortions in all cases"32
- takes on a more troubling significance. That provision of the
Pennsylvania law is the only one the Court held unconstitutional, so
this language appears to describe the limits of what sort of regulations
the Court will now find unconstitutional. If so, the only state restric-
tions that will be held unconstitutional will be those that constrain
some women as completely as did the criminal prohibitions struck
26. E.g., Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (a 5-4 deci-
sion written by Justice Blackmun, invalidating a requirement, among others, that certain re-
ports be made and certain limitations be placed on post-viability abortions); Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (a 6-3 decision, authored by Justice Powell, in-
validating various regulations, including a mandatory waiting period and a requirement that
all abortions after the first trimester be performed in a hospital).
27. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
28. Id. at 870.
29. Id. at 878.
30. Id. at 876-78.
31. Id. at 877.
32. Id. at 894.
1986 [Vol. 100:1980
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down in Roe. Not just burdens, but only total barriers, are in fact "un-
due." That, apparently, is Roe's "essential holding."33
This reinterpretation of Roe led the plurality Justices to uphold
provisions of the Pennsylvania statute that would have been unconsti-
tutional under prior law. For example, the Pennsylvania statue in-
cluded an "informed consent" provision that required a woman seek-
ing an abortion be given certain specified information before the
procedure and that the information be both conveyed by a physician
and provided to the woman at least twenty-four hours in advance of
the abortion.34 Ten years earlier, in Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health (Akron I),35 written for the Court by Justice Powell, the
Court had held a similar "informed consent" provision unconstitu-
tional because it was designed to discourage abortion rather than to
promote valid state interests in the health of the woman. Akron I
struck down a requirement that information be communicated by a
physician on the grounds that the regulation was "unreasonable,"36
and it invalidated a mandatory 24-hour waiting period after "consent"
because the waiting period unnecessarily increased the costs of abor-
tion.37 The Court noted that a waiting period would require women to
make two separate visits to the abortion provider.38 An additional visit
could mean greater expense, longer travel time, increased exposure to
harassment by anti-abortion protestors, and greater difficulty for
women who live in parts of the country where abortion providers are
33. The few post-Casey abortion cases are consistent with this interpretation. In Ma-
zurek v. Armstrong, a per curiam opinion from which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer
dissented, the Court found no "undue burden" in a Montana law that may have been pur-
posefully designed to discourage abortions. 520 U.S. 968 (1997). The Court summarily re-
versed a preliminary injunction issued by the Ninth Circuit against a law that restricted the
performance of abortion to licensed physicians. Plaintiffs had argued that the law specifically
targeted one particular physician's assistant who had been performing abortions in a state
with relatively few doctors. The Court found dispositive the lower courts' conclusion that the
effect of the ban was not substantial. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court did strike down a Ne-
braska law that banned "dilation and extraction" abortions. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). Justice
O'Connor, who provided the fifth vote for the majority, thought it critical that the law
lacked any exception for abortions that were necessary to preserve the life or health of the
pregnant woman. She suggested that the law would be constitutional if "there were adequate
alternative methods for a woman safely to obtain an abortion before viability." Id. at 951.
34. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990). This information included "the nature of the pro-
cedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age
of the unborn child.' " Casey, 505 U.S. at 881. The woman would also be offered optional
printed materials that described the fetus, informed her about the support obligations of the
father of a child, and listed agencies that could help with adoption. Id.
35. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
36. Id. at 448.
37. Id. at 449-51.
38. Id. at 450.
June 20021 1987
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rare.39 After Casey, similar regulations are permissible. While the plu-
rality understood that these regulations were designed to discourage
abortions and could be very burdensome, it held that they do not pose
"substantial" obstacles.4 ° They do not infringe the woman's constitu-
tional right, but only make the right more difficult to exercise.41 To
complain about having to wait an extra day, as the three
Justices saw it, was to insist upon "abortion on demand."42
Despite its sensitivity elsewhere in the opinion about what abor-
tion rights have meant for women, in the sections adopting the "undue
burden" test, the Casey plurality is suspicious about what motivates a
woman's choice to have an abortion and insensitive to the weight of
burdens that fall short of total obstruction. In fact, the opinion turns
the "pro-choice" rhetoric of Roe supporters against a sympathetic in-
terpretation of the right recognized in that opinion. The Court seems
to ask: how can women who argue for "choice" object to being fully
informed, to hearing that "there are philosophic and social arguments
of great weight.., in favor of continuing the pregnancy, '43 to being
subject to state persuasion? According to the plurality, requirements
like the twenty-four hour waiting period simply further choice by en-
suring that it is "thoughtful and informed."44
Although the expected deathblow to Roe v. Wade was not deliv-
ered, when the plurality concludes its discussion of the Pennsylvania
statute, it is apparent that only a sliver remains. What Casey gives a
woman is simply "some freedom to terminate her pregnancy"45 if she
does so before the fetus becomes viable.
The Court's opinion does not have a single, identified author. This
is unusual. It seems to be a technique adopted to communicate that a
subset of Justices" is uniquely united behind an approach to a par-
39. The plurality in Casey acknowledged that the district court in that case had found
these to be the consequences of the waiting requirement there. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86
(citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1351-52 (1990)).
40. Id. at 886-87.
41. Id. at 887.
42. Id. The Casey plurality also upheld the constitutionality of reporting requirements
similar to those struck down in Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747
(1986).
43. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 869 (emphasis added).
46. As in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), a group of three Justices joined in all sec-
tions of the opinion, while other Justices joined only certain parts. Some sections - Part IV
(which rejects Roe's trimester framework and adopts undue burden analysis), Part VB
(which upholds the "informed consent" requirement), and VD (holding the parental consent
requirement to be constitutional) - are joined in only by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter. Another, Part VE (invalidating the record-keeping and reporting requirements), is
joined only by those three and Justice Stevens. The rest speak for a five-Justice majority.
1988 [Vol. 100:1980
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ticularly controversial constitutional question.47 But in Casey the tech-
nique is unsettling because the Court adopts an internally inconsistent
view of the situation of women. For example, although the section
overturning the spousal notification requirement contains an extensive
and powerful discussion of the dire situation of a battered woman in
an abusive relationship, elsewhere, writing about the reliance of
women on Roe, the majority suggests in passing that the only reasons
why a woman might find herself pregnant with an unwanted child are
lack of planning and contraceptive failure.48 It does not, apparently,
occur to the author of this section that abusive husbands (or lovers or
strangers) might force sex on women or refuse to use contraceptives
- unless this sort of coercion is encompassed by the opinion's refer-
ence to "unplanned activity," a cold phrase for a painful reality.
In the discussion of spousal notification, the Court understands
that an abusive husband may have so much physical and psychological
control over his wife that he can make it impossible for her to obtain
an abortion.49 The Court sees the husband's power over his wife, given
legal significance by the state through the spousal notification re-
quirement, as the equivalent of the requirement of spousal consent
struck down in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth."
For women in dependent or abusive relationships, consent and notifi-
cation can have the same effect as the criminal prohibition on abortion
struck down in Roe. This is the only specific example of an "undue
burden" in Casey. Undue burdens create total barriers to terminating
a pregnancy even for very determined women.
"The essential holding of Roe" 51 as reaffirmed in Casey is simply
this: states cannot pass laws preventing a woman, no matter how
committed, clever or desperate she is, from getting an abortion in the
early stage of her pregnancy. Governments may not constitutionally
make abortion impossible, but they may insist that women fight hard
to exercise their right.
There is something familiar about this approach to the conse-
quences of sex for women. The plurality's version of the appropriate
standard for protecting women's right to choose abortion - its appli-
cation of the undue burden test - has much in common with the
common law's traditional approach to consent in rape cases. Rape law
once, and not so long ago, required evidence of considerable physical
47. See, e.g., the joint opinion for five Justices in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(capital punishment), and the extensive per curiam opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (campaign finance reform).
48. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 ("Abortion is customarily chosen as an unplanned response to
the consequence of unplanned activity or to the failure of conventional birth control ... .
49. Id. at 897.
50. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
51. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
1989June 20021
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resistance from a woman before it would accept that force, rather than
consent, led to intercourse. 2 In Casey, we find another version of this
argument: only when a woman resists to the utmost and still fails to
determine the uses to which her body will be put will the law find that
her rights have been violated. In all other cases, whatever the persua-
sion, the pressure, and the difficulties that have been put in her way,
she will be deemed to have chosen her fate.
It should not be surprising to find that the constitutional law of
abortion and the criminal law of rape are similar. Both involve sexual
situations that are inherently ambiguous. Pregnancy and sexual inter-
course can be eagerly sought, the source of deep happiness for women,
or they can be extraordinarily painful, even ruinous - depending on
the context and the woman's sense that they are freely chosen. A par-
ticular individual woman can be joyous about one pregnancy and in
despair about another, just as she can welcome sex in some situations
and resist it in others. This is most often, of course, a rational response
on her part to real differences, but the phenomenon seems to have
given rise to a deep suspicion that women may not know their own
minds, or that their minds are changeable.
In rape law, that suspicion has been exacerbated by a legitimate
desire to tip the balance in favor of a defendant whose freedom is at
stake. In abortion law, that suspicion finds expression in the concern
that abortion not be "on demand" and, perhaps, in Casey's willingness
to find ever serious burdens like the twenty-four-hour waiting period
not "undue." In both contexts, the law has struggled to distinguish be-
tween those situations in which women have been or will be happy de-
spite their immediate doubts, and those that are truly terrible for the
woman involved. There is even an undercurrent that questions her de-
spair: how burdensome really is this particular instance of intercourse
or this particular pregnancy when other women, and even this woman
at another time, would choose it voluntarily? How much is she really
being asked to bear?
This uneasiness and lack of certainty is revealed in Casey's two
voices. One voice is fully attentive to the critical significance of abor-
tion rights in allowing women during the last decades of the twentieth
century to play a much larger role in American political and economic
life and also deeply aware of the way in which domestic violence can
close off all options for some women. The other is willing to let a
woman suffer the consequences if she is not strong or assertive enough
to overcome financial, physical, or psychological barriers placed be-
fore her by the state. Despite its willingness to reaffirm Roe, the Casey
opinion suffers from the Court's failure to develop a coherent and
52. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984); Commonwealth v. Mlinarich,
498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Commonwealth v. Biggs, 467 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983).
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confident theory of what abortion rights have meant for women over
the years since Roe was decided.
III. ATrENTIVE SCHOLARSHIP
There is an excellent body of legal and non-legal scholarship that
has attempted to bridge the gap between sensitivity and suspicion.
Two of the very best essays, quite different from each other, were
published in the Michigan Law Review. One of them, Donald Regan's
1979 article, Rewriting Roe v. Wade,53 develops an equal protection
argument for abortion rights that holds even if the fetus is regarded as
a full legal person. Along the way he describes, in frightening detail,
the physical burdens of pregnancy and childbirth. The other, Martha
Mahoney's Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation,54 is not about abortion. Instead, it answers the domestic
violence question, "why didn't she walk away?," by identifying the
physical risks faced by women who try to leave their abusers.
Mahoney's analysis is directly relevant to the spousal notification
question before the Court in Casey, but she also paints a powerful pic-
ture of what it means to be a mother and of how a woman's individual
interests are subordinated to the demands of her children even in life-
threatening situations. Both articles illustrate what is being imposed
on women when they are forced to become mothers.
The physical burdens of childbirth and pregnancy are central to
Regan's analysis. He argues that anti-abortion laws require women to
undergo physical impositions of a kind that the law otherwise refuses
to impose on people who are in a position to aid their fellow humans:
"[i]t is a deeply rooted principle of American law that an individual is
ordinarily not required to volunteer aid to another individual who is in
danger or in need of assistance."55 An unwillingly pregnant woman,
uniquely, and therefore unconstitutionally, is asked to undergo signifi-
cant pain and risk for another, with permanent consequences for her
body. Regan's detailed description of what happens to a woman's
body even during a normal and healthy pregnancy is both daunting
and familiar. Even the most minor consequences can be very unpleas-
ant. They include:
complaints involving general inconvenience or discomfort: a tendency to
faintness (generally limited to the first fourteen weeks); nausea and pos-
sibly vomiting (generally limited to the first fourteen weeks); tiredness
(pronounced in the first fourteen weeks, then disappearing, to reappear
near the end of pregnancy); insomnia (difficulty going to sleep caused by
inability in late pregnancy to find a comfortable position in bed, com-
53. See Regan, supra note 5.
54. See Mahoney, supra note 6.
55. Regan, supra note 5, at 1570.
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pounded by difficulty going back to sleep when wakened by a kicking fe-
tus or by the need for frequent urination which accompanies pregnancy,
also compounded by general disruption of the body's internal tempera-
ture-regulation mechanism); slowed reflexes; poor coordination; uncer-
tainty of balance (caused by increase and redistribution of body weight);
manual clumsiness in the morning (caused by swollen fingers and carpal-
tunnel syndrome); shortness of breath following even mild exertion; and
new aversions to certain foods or smells (especially fatty or spicy
foods).56
Regan goes on to describe the more serious common physical effects,
including permanent painful consequences, and the small risk of seri-
ous complications leading to death.
Mahoney argues that remaining within an abusive relationship is
often a rational response to a very real physical threat of "separation
assault." The woman who stays has not learned "helplessness," but in-
stead accurately perceives that she will increase the danger to herself
and her children by trying to leave her abuser. Focusing on the domes-
tic violence context, Mahoney challenges the law's expectation, also
found in rape and abortion cases, that women can be required to vin-
dicate their own interests by forceful, aggressive action. She uses
women's stories of their own experiences to capture what it is like to
live within an abusive relationship and gives us a powerful picture of
the responsibilities of motherhood. Mahoney's stories are drawn from
her own conversations with women and from the work of others. As a
whole, they form a powerful picture of how intelligent, competent
women live with abuse. One woman's story of being distracted by the
demands of her children immediately after a violent attack, will sound
familiar even to mothers who have never been in such a terrifying
situation:
Two days after he broke the glass in the door, it was the middle of a
hot summer afternoon. My son was asleep in his crib in my room, my
daughter was taking a nap in hers. I was lying in bed reading. Suddenly, I
heard a popping noise, and glass started crashing to the floor. Someone
was shooting through my windows. There were no bullets flying around
- I remember wondering if it was an air rifle. The windows kept shat-
tering, and I didn't know what would happen if anything hit the baby.
I grabbed him out of the crib, got down toward the floor, and half-
crawled out of the room. I took him downstairs. Of course, he was only
three-months-old, when he woke up he had to nurse. Then I had to
change his diaper. Then my daughter started crying - she had waked up
from her nap. Then I had to change her diaper. Then she was hungry.
Then I had to change his diaper again. By then he had to nurse again ....
56. Id. at 1579-80.
1992 [Vol. 100:1980
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1992 2001-2002
Looking Back on Casey
At 5:30 when I took them upstairs for their baths, I noticed the glass
all over the floor. That was when I remembered what had happened...
Regan's and Mahoney's articles ask lawmakers to face reality. To
require a woman to carry a fetus to term, and to make her a mother
imposes an extraordinary burden. That these burdens may be ac-
cepted and even welcomed at some points in a woman's life does not
make them insignificant even when they are chosen. When they are
compelled, they can be intolerable.
IV. MORAL CONFLICT
To fully appreciate why many women feel that significant restric-
tions on abortion force them to give their lives over to the purposes of
others, it is important to understand that the choice to have an abor-
tion, like the choice to bear a child to term, may be based on an under-
standing of one's ethical obligations. It is unfair to characterize the
debate over abortion as turning on the balance of morality and con-
venience, or even on the weighing of obligations to others versus self-
actualization. Each side has its own moral vision. On both sides, the
critical question is one of responsibility to future generations. For
those who believe that a fetus is equivalent to a living person, the
moral choice is to carry the pregnancy to its term. For those who do
not share this belief but who have a strong sense of a mother's obliga-
tions to her living children, it may be immoral to give birth to a child
unless these obligations can be fulfilled.
Some people think that the dilemma is easily avoided. A woman
who does not want to carry a child to term, they say, can simply avoid
intercourse or use contraceptives." These are real options for many
women, and they are more real now than they were at the time of Roe
v. Wade was decided. Roe is less universally significant than it was in
the 1970s. In many communities, single motherhood is no longer an
overwhelming disgrace. Contraceptives are both more safe and more
reliable.
57. Mahoney, supra note 6, at 22-23 (quoting LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION, at x (1985)).
58. David B. Cruz describes this argument in "The Sexual Freedom Cases"? Contracep-
tion, Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 322-23
(2000):
In the vast majority of cases, especially at the time that Roe was decided, pregnancy occurs
only after peno-vaginal intercourse. If a woman did not wish to bear the burdens of con-
tinuing a pregnancy to term and giving birth to a child, or if a couple did not want to risk a
pregnancy, she could forgo such intercourse. The availability of this alternative means that
most women, at least so far as statutory prohibitions or commands are concerned, could
avoid the restrictions imposed by abortion bans, such as the one struck down in Roe, by giv-
ing up one kind of sex.
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But being a parent, whether single or married, is still accompanied
by uniquely disruptive long-term obligations that can overwhelm eve-
rything else in life, and contraceptives are not yet perfect. In some
communities, being an unwed mother brings disgrace upon the entire
family. Abstinence is not always an option even for the most prudent.
Even putting rape aside, few marriages are based on the expectation
that there will be no intercourse until the wife has decided that she
wishes to bear a child.
The odds of avoiding unwanted pregnancies have improved, but
many women are still faced with them. Some of these women will be
at risk of harm or in despair. What they choose to do will depend upon
their deepest beliefs. Whether a pregnant woman considers herself to
be bearing a child who has a human identity from the moment of con-
ception, or perhaps to be undergoing a natural process that begins
with the splitting of cells and ends in a live birth, will depend on her
upbringing, reading, reflection, and religious affiliation. The experi-
ence of pregnancy does not help resolve the matter, for how a preg-
nant woman interprets her bodily sensations turns on what she expects
to feel. Some women find it impossible, especially in the early stages,
to think of themselves as harboring a separate person.
When abortion is made difficult or unavailable to these women,
they are forced to conform to someone else's spiritual vision. We un-
derstand how painful that can be when a fundamentalist government,
like the former regime in Afghanistan, requires women under its
authority to wear the veil. Although the consequences of forbidding
abortion are much more intimate, painful and long-lasting, both situa-
tions impose religious views held by only some members of society on
all women. Both ask women to accept another's definition of their life
possibilities. Women who are constrained from seeking abortions that
do not violate their own sense of moral imperatives are being asked to
subordinate their lives to the purposes of others - not just to their
unwanted children, but also to ethical and spiritual views that they do
not share.
Nor is bearing a child and putting it up for adoption an easy alter-
native. Just as some women regard abortion as morally unacceptable,
others consider it unethical to avoid responsibility for a child after
birth. To these women, ignoring the existence of a child born of them,
and living in their world, rejecting all ties and obligations to that child,
can be much more morally reprehensible than having an abortion. To
require these women to carry a child to term places them, according to
their own ethical scheme, in a situation without options. From this
perspective, choosing abortion is not a selfish insistence on one's own
convenience precisely because choosing to give birth to a child creates
an enduring ethical commitment they would not shirk.
By insisting that decisionmakers take a hard look at what abortion
restrictions can mean for women, ethically as well as physically and
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emotionally, I do not claim that there will be easy solutions to the con-
stitutional questions. Casey preserved Roe while suggesting that most
state restrictions on abortion will survive constitutional scrutiny. This
is a consequence, I believe, of the plurality's failure to appreciate the
depth of the moral conflict involved. And Roe itself was vulnerable
because it paid so little attention to the anguish on both sides of the
question. Life itself, what it means to live a life, and what we owe to
our children are at stake for both. I do want to suggest that any com-
promise - assuming that a case like Casey is meant to be a compro-
mise - should be more consistently self-conscious that it is demand-
ing large sacrifices from both sides.
Nothing helpful is achieved by rhetorical wars of description.
These just lead to bitter confrontations like the recent, disheartening
example of Stenberg v. Carhart,9 where the majority and the dissent
fought over the proper way to talk about a "dilation and extraction"
procedure. The case reaffirmed that state restrictions on abortion
must exempt situations where a woman's life or health is in danger,
but there was very little discussion in Stenberg of what was actually at
stake for women. The dissents were furious, even though the statute
on its face would require some women to face very serious physical
risk. The Casey plurality, and perhaps its grudging compromise, dis-
solved, for Justice Kennedy wrote one of the several angry dissents.
His outrage was suggested by his repeated references to the plaintiff as
an "abortionist" rather than a "physician," an explicit slap at the doc-
tor's motives and competence.6" Words, especially enraged and con-
temptuous words, will not resolve this debate, for what is clear to ei-
ther side is contested by the other.
The constitutional question posed by abortion cannot be "when
does life begin." Legal analysis cannot answer that question, so it can-
not be the test or doctrinal structure on which the right to abortion
hinges. Justice Breyer began his majority opinion in Stenberg by de-
fining his task as the search for a law that could "govern a society
whose different members sincerely hold directly opposing views."'" Al-
though it was not seriously addressed by the Court, that is the only
sensible question. This is a debate where there are strong moral com-
mitments on both sides, not an argument between those who believe
that a fetus is life and others who do not want to be inconvenienced.
The constitutional question at the core of the abortion dispute must be
about our political community: how do we live together when we can-
not reach consensus, when we have deeply held, but inconsistent,
moral beliefs? And what we can require of each other in the service of
59. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
60. E.g., id. at 953-54, 959-60, 965, 968, 975-79.
61. Id. at 921.
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our own beliefs? This question cannot be answered without a genuine
effort to understand why each side cares so much. Otherwise, we do
not appreciate what we ask of each other. The jurisprudence of abor-
tion has been handicapped by the Court's failure, from the beginning,
to articulate why the issue is so important to both sides. Scholarship
that reminds us, if it is heeded, makes for more credible and more sta-
ble legal doctrine.
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